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Climate Change, Intergenerational Justice and Development
by Prof. Dr. Christoph Lumer
bstract: The subject of this paper is
distributive justice in relation to fi-
nancing greenhouse gas abatement.
After separating the various questions of distri-
butive justice in climate change (first section)
and isolating the financing issue (second sec-
tion), the paper explores whether any eﬀective
moral norms resolving this question already
exist. It is argued that such norms still have to
be constructed. As a basis for the further dis-
cussion, a criterion for moral duties is proposed,
progressive norm welfarism, which takes up the
constructivist idea (third section).These ethical,
intuitive and political considerations finally
converge into a proposal for ‘no harm to deve-
loping countries’ (fourth section).
Questions of distributive justice in climate
change
Climate change raises several questions of
intergenerational, international and intrana-
tional justice, in particular: 1. Reduction tar-
get:Howmuch should greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions be reduced? 2. Measure mix:How
much should we rely on emission reduction
and how much on adaptation, mitigation
and compensation measures? 3. Financing:
Who shall pay how much for these mea-
sures?
The importance and urgency of this ques-
tion has been made evident recently by vari-
ous developments. In 2006 the rapidly
increasing Chinese CO2 emissions surpassed
those of the USA, which for decades were
the largest emitter. Since 2005 industrial
countries have been emitting less CO2 than
the rest of the world. Whereas GHG emis-
sions in the 1990s increased by 0.9 percent
per year, in the first (not yet full) decade of
the new millennium (2000-2007) they in-
creased by 3.5 percent per year. While the
carbon intensity of economic activities (i.e.
the amount of CO2 released per Euro GDP)
had decreased for decades, it increased from
2003 to 2005 – despite the eﬀorts to curb
emissions in several Kyoto Protocol signa-
tory countries.The main cause of this trend
reversal is the massive increase in energy
consumption in China and India, served
mainly by – outdated – coal combustion.1
These also are problems of distributive jus-
tice because China and India do not recog-
nize any strong obligation to curb their
emissions. They do not accept that they
should pay for restrictions on their emissi-
ons with strong constraints of their econo-
mic development – in particular considering
that the much richer First World countries,
which are polluting more per capita, did not
undergo analogous restrictions when devel-
oping at comparable economic levels and are
responsible for most of the high increase of
atmospheric GHG concentration occurring
since the industrial revolution.
Isolating the financing question
Tradable emission certificates are not only
an important economic instrument for mak-
ing GHG attenuation more eﬃcient but
also an analytic device to separate – at least
partially – the question of reduction targets
(question 1) from the question of how to fi-
nance this reduction (question 3).2The que-
stion of reduction targets corresponds to
determining the total number of emission
certificates, whereas the financing question
corresponds to determining certificate distri-
bution.The latter holds because if trade in
certificates functions properly, having more
certificates is equivalent to possessing a cer-
tain amount of capital.The answers to the
two questions are only incompletely sepera-
ble though because fair answers depend on
people’s comprehensive well-being under the
respective regulations, and, of course, this
well-being depends on all the main factors
touched on by the two questions: the many
direct eﬀects of a more or less warm world
(from stifling heat waves to climate casual-
ties e.g. by undernourishment), economic
abatement costs and economic development.
Whereas the question of reduction targets at
first seems to be more an issue of intergen-
erational justice and the question of finan-
cing reduction a matter of international
justice, even this holds only partially; since
intergenerational and international justice
are intertwined for at least two reasons:
lenient global reduction targets (intergen-








position their agriculture will suﬀer more, in
addition they have less money for adapta-
tion measures). And strong abatement obli-
gations / fewer certificates for poor countries
today (international justice) ceteris paribus
imply less development and therefore more
relative poverty in the future (intergenera-
tional justice). Nonetheless, for reducing
complexity and for delimiting the unmana-
geably high number of possible options, one
can roughly fix one of the variables by assu-
ming more or less plausible values for this
resulting from other discussions and try to
give a justified answer to the other question
on this basis.
So, to answer the financing question, we
need a rough idea of the reduction target.
However, in the literature rather divergent
targets have been proposed. One problem
that has led to this divergence is the great
disparity of advantages and disadvantages
accompanying the various options. Simple
moral principles do not allow considering
and pondering all of them. For that purpose,
complex and elaborate models are needed to
quantify all the advantages and disadvanta-
ges in one common currency.The currency
economists use is money; they usually pro-
pose rather modest reduction targets. Most
ethicists, however, find that money cannot
capture the real moral value of things; many
of them prefer the currency of well-being or
utility instead, which is expected to give
more weight to certain damages like death
and thus to lead to far more demanding re-
duction targets. However, welfare calcula-
tions with well-being as the general currency
are even more complex than monetizing, so
adequate calculations are still a desideratum.
A
Unless we stop dumping 70 million tons of global warming
pollution into the atmosphere every 24 hours,which we
are doing right now (…), the continued acceleration of this
pollution will destroy the future of human civilization.
/Al Gore/
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A much weaker though still, at least in the
long run, strong prompter would be moral
obligations sustained by informal social
norms, i.e. rather generally observed modes
of acting whose known non-observation will
be punished by informal sanctions imple-
mented by any other moral subjects, where
the informal sanctions may range from ut-
terances of disapproval to lynch law. The
most obvious candidates for such informally
valid moral norms are the no-harm and the
polluter-pays principle.
With respect to the no-harm principle,
however, it is not obvious what it requires in
this case. In an immediate sense, every
breath we take harms other people insofar as
it (albeit marginally) increases the atmos-
phere's GHG concentration. Of course, it
would be absurd to require not harming
other people by not breathing.The problem
is that any, even marginal, emission is harm-
ful only on the basis of an already tremen-
dously high level of emissions by other
people. So a more sensible interpretation of
the no-harm principle is to, first, determine
which global level of GHG emissions would
be harmless in the sense of being sustain-
able, then, second, to break this global budg-
et down to the individual level, e.g. in an
egalitarian fashion, and, third, to take trans-
gressions of these individual budgets as the
harms prohibited by the no-harm principle.
The first step leads to a rule similar to the
above mentioned sustainable reduction (op-
tion a4), with the important diﬀerence of re-
quiring sustainable reduction immediately.
The fact that the vast majority does not ob-
serve this limit,8 according to the definition
of ‘informal norm’, already implies that a re-
spective informal moral norm is not socially
in force. In addition, immediately reducing
all persons’ GHG emissions to a sustainable
level would cause severe economic damages
to other persons as well, which means that
the no-harm principle would be violated in
any case. And finally, the second step, i.e. to
distribute emission rights equally, is not mor-
ally evident because this rule considers nei-
ther interpersonally diﬀerent needs and costs
nor abilities to pay.
The status of the polluter-pays principle is
not much better because it is far from clear
what this principle requires in the case of
to cooperate, i.e. not to abate their emis-
sions, even though mutual cooperation
would be better for each individual), is to
sign a binding contract for reaching forced
mutual cooperation.
However, the strategy of simply relying on a
contract is problematic for several reasons,
which require at least a moral complement
to contractualist proposals. First, a better cli-
mate, the aim of cooperation, is a public
good (or, more precisely, a common-sink re-
source).This implies that even those who do
not participate in the contract profit from
other people’s participation in an agreement
(the USA have profited in this way from the
Kyoto Protocol, free riding on the signatory
states’ eﬀorts).Therefore, the usual threat in
negotiations, i.e. that without mutual agree-
ment and, therefore, in particular without
one’s own agreement everybody is reduced
to the status quo, does not work in this case.
Unforced agreement has to be based on rea-
sons beyond the expectations for a better cli-
mate, in particular on moral reasons like
wanting to be fair or to contribute to a bet-
ter future. Second, contracts can be made
only between living people. However, the
biggest advantages of a contract (and disad-
vantages of a failure) would inure to future
persons; and in a fair contract their interests,
of course, have to be considered. Because
their interests do not coincide with those of
present persons and require stronger envi-
ronmental investments a morally just con-
tract calls for a moral engagement beyond
the satisfaction of the present contracting
parties’ personal interests.Third, even if cli-
mate protection were not a public good (so
that only those who participate in the con-
tract would profit from improvement mea-
sures) the potential damages as well as
advantages and disadvantages are distribu-
ted so unequally that a merely rational con-
tract (e.g. according to the Nash solution)
would be far from just - as is often the case
with rational contracts. So it might be a ra-
tional, though morally disgusting, result that
the most aggrieved have to pay the strongest
polluters for reducing their GHG emissions.
So a morally just contract again requires a
moral engagement beyond the parties’ per-
sonal interests.
What could motivate such a moral engage-
ment? The strongest kind of prompter
would be moral obligations sustained by for-
mal, i.e. legal norms. However, the problem
is that such norms do not yet exist; the fair
contract to be concluded should constitute
exactly such a norm.
I have undertaken such a study, which in-
cludes also the application of several ethical
standard criteria.3 On account of the con-
vergence of these criteria, the study’s results
with regard to the morally best and morally
required CO2 reduction targets may provide
a rather strong basis for assuming a reduc-
tion target in the present context.
In the study four options were considered,
namely a1: business as usual, a2: global sta-
bilization of GHG emissions at the 1990
level, a3: strong (25 percent) GHG emission
reduction with respect to 1990 until 2015,
a4: sustainable (60 percent) GHG emission
reduction compared to 1990 until 2035. (A
50-70% reduction of emissions is needed to
prevent most of the usually projected dama-
ges.4 In 1990 sustainable reduction meant a
decrease to about 0.4 t C/capita x year.) Sus-
tainable reduction (a4) turned out to be mo-
rally best or morally required by the vast
majority of the moral criteria taken into ac-
count.5 Considering, however, that annual
global CO2 emissions from 1990 (5.85 Gt
C/yr) to 2007 (8.1 Gt C/yr) increased by
roughly 39 percent (China alone: increase
from 0.7 to 1.8 Gt C/yr),6 the morally best
option now seems almost unreachable.
Therefore, the following discussion will pre-
suppose that the community of states will
ideally only strive for strong reduction until
2030.
Are there eﬀective moral norms for the
financing problem? – A case for moral
constructivism and progressive norm wel-
farism
With respect to the interests of future
people, GHG abatement may be a moral re-
quirement. However, among present people
(and the states representing them), GHG
emissions – like many other environmental
problems – constitute an n-person prisoner's
dilemma: (i) for (almost) everybody, higher
GHG concentrations are worse than (ii) the
lower concentrations that could be reached
by global cooperation in reduction eﬀorts;7
but (iii) if only few people make strong ef-
forts their situation is even worse than it
would be if no eﬀorts were made at all (be-
cause the eﬀorts are costly, but the global re-
duction achieved is only marginal); (iv)
finally, free-riding on the vast majority's re-
duction eﬀorts is the best option from a self-
ish point of view (the free-rider benefits
from the better climate without paying for
it).The most obvious and, in this case, prob-
ably only solution to the resulting dilemma
(i.e. that rationality requires the egoists not
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Global warming causing climate
change may be the ultimate issue
that unites us all.
/ Louise Burfitt-Dons /
An even weaker form of moral obligation
that could perhaps enforce moral engage-
ment in the climate question could result
from the ontological kind of moral norms
endorsed by moral realists (like Brink,
McNaughton, Schaber), who think that
there are moral norms independent of our
subjective attitudes. However, in metaethics
the idea of such a moral reality has been
strongly criticized for ontological, epistemo-
logical and practical reasons.12 Here is not
the place to elaborate these arguments. I can
only assume that such a moral reality and its
norms probably do not exist.The positive
lesson of those criticisms is that moral reality
is a man-made construct and that stronger
moral norms, which really help to resolve
the problems of global warming, have to be
socially introduced and enforced, preferably
by legal norms.
So, there are no norms in the deontological
sense and hence no obligations in a strict
sense apart from legal and socially valid
norms. Not all legal and social norms, how-
ever, are at once moral norms and obliga-
tions - think e.g. of racist laws - but only
those that can be morally justified, namely as
being morally good according to a concep-
tion of the morally good.The most widely
accepted family of such conceptions is wel-
farist, i.e. it conceives the moral desirability
of an object p as a function of the indivi-
duals’ desirabilities / utilities of p. One such
conception is utilitarianism, which equates
moral desirability simply with the sum (or
the mean) of all the individuals’ respective
desirabilities of p; another conception is
prioritarianism, which gives greater priority
to improving the lot of people worse oﬀ, and
the greater priority, the worse oﬀ these
people are; still a further conception ismod-
erate welfare egalitarianism, which over and
above the sum of individual desirabilities
gives higher rankings to more equal distri-
butions; etc. In the following, I presuppose
one of these welfarist conceptions of the mor-
ally good; but for the present purpose it is
not very important to specify which one.13 If
our moral obligations (in the strict sense) do
not go beyond what the morally good legal
and socially valid norms require, this is far
less than what we can morally do. Most
utilitarians find that this is insuﬃcient and
postulate a moral duty to always do what is
morally best (in utilitarian terms). However,
this has been criticized as an excessive de-
mand and as moral exploitation; in addition,
it again postulates an ontologically obscure
obligation. A far more appealing middle
Intergenerational Justice Review
Volume 9 · Issue 3/2009
course between an illusory excessive demand
and the unambitious fulfillment of low ob-
ligations is progressive normativism. Progres-
sive normativism tries to raise the standards
of moral duties at least historically, in the
long run. It says, first, that morally respon-
sible people should politically try to enforce
the morally best legal and informal norms
that are currently realizable, thereby histori-
cally improving the stock of social norms,
and, second, that everybody is morally
bound to such norms. Progressive normati-
vism thus implements the constructivist les-
sons concerning the reality of moral norms.
In the following welfarism will be taken to
be the right conception of moral value, and
progressive normativism will be presupposed
as the right conception of moral norms;
their combination may be called ‘progressive
norm welfarism’.14
A proposal for constructing the financing
norm: no harm for developing countries
Progressive norm welfarism is a basic and
general criterion for moral evaluation and
moral duties (a “primary principle”, so to
speak). Now we have to look for more con-
crete and specific precepts, directives or
norms (or, somewhat paradoxically, ‘second-
ary principles’) to be applied in more specific
situations, such as that of the financing
problem, and which may be justified by the
primary moral principles.The no-harm and
the polluter-pays ‘principles’ are already such
more specific precepts; and so are the solu-
tions to be discussed in the following.
According to the discussion in the second
section, the financing question can be
reduced to the question of how to distribute
(the reduced number of ) GHG emission
certificates. Many proposals regarding this
distribution have been discussed. Some of
them are rather implausible, so can be dis-
carded quickly.This holds in particular for
grandfathering and distribution according
to GDP.
Grandfatheringmeans to distribute emission
certificates proportionally to present emis-
sions so that every nation has to reduce its
emissions by the same factor.This principle
rewards present emission ineﬃciency (i.e. in-
eﬃcient use of the limited sink capacities of
90
GHG emissions. It could require payment
for damages generated by emissions above
the sustainable level – but to whom? To fu-
ture generations via investing in a kind of
fund from which they will be compensated?
Again, this is far from being a common
practice and thus not an informally holding
social norm. And then, would not the best
investment be increasing the national capital
and since this is something we aim to do
anyway, so that the most important change
compared to the current practice would not
regard us but only our heirs (who would
have to use some part of the inherited capi-
tal for compensating those who will be da-
maged across the respective national
borders)? A stronger interpretation of the
polluter-pays principle demands that we also
pay the so-called ‘historical debts’, i.e. dam-
ages caused by excessive emissions in the
past. Again disregarding the diﬃcult ques-
tion of what ‘excessive’ would imply, it is du-
bious whether present people can have such
historical debts resulting from their ance-
stors’ activities or from their own activities
before the harmful eﬀects of GHG emis-
sions became more or less vague common
knowledge, i.e. around 1990. And since im-
mediate and radical emission cuts to a sus-
tainable level at that date would have
extensively damaged the whole economic
system and thus other people, it is dubious
whether all post-1990 emissions above that
level have generated historical debts (Some
further discussion of historical debts will be
provided below).
The upshot of this discussion is that there do
not seem to be even halfway clear moral
norms already informally socially in force.
On the other hand, there seems at least to
emerge a vague informal social norm to
practically recognize one’s responsibility as a
GHG emitter towards the vulnerable and
future people by reducing one’s emissions
where this is not expensive as well as perhaps
also another norm for politicians to make
stronger emission reductions legally bind-
ing.9 (The internationally widespread moral
disgust about the former US-president
George Bush’s and his followers’ hardliner
activities would be part of the sanctioning
behavior belonging to this informal social
norm.) Although the fact that these norms
are becoming socially valid constitutes moral
progress, they are only vague and weak10 in-
formal norms, which - for resolving the pro-
blem - demand too little, do not provide
much motivation and cannot be establish a
guide for stronger legal norms.11
Your grandchildren will likely find it
incredible - or even sinful - that you
burned up a gallon of gasoline to
fetch a pack of cigarettes!
/ Paul MacCready, Jr. /
people better oﬀ (prioritarianism, leximin)
or because a welfare transfer from the better
oﬀ to the worse oﬀ is valued positively (wel-
fare egalitarianism). A third reason streng-
thening this preference still further is the
diﬀerence in the purchasing power of
money, which implies that the same dollar
spent on energy eﬃcient high technology
bought in the international market results in
greater losses in purchasing power for local
products in poorer countries than in rich
countries.
The preference between the two principles
in welfare ethics is evident. Whether this
preference shall be translated into a respec-
tive contract and legal norm, according to
progressive normativism, depends on the
question of whether this is the best norm
that could be realized; and since the prefer-
ence question has already been answered, it
now depends on the issue of whether
NHDC is politically realizable. Now, of
course, the vast majority of politicians in
rich countries will promptly oppose the im-
plementation of this principle simply be-
cause it costs more. However, at second
glance, financing highly eﬃcient energy
technologies in poorer countries may well
turn out to be the only way of reaching the
desired global emission reductions because
it may be the only way to make these coun-
tries participate in a globally concerted
abatement eﬀort. Without this kind of fi-
nancing and technological support, develo-
ping countries (in particular China and
India), insisting on their ‘right’ to fast devel-
opment, will probably continue to base their
development on cheap and dirty energy
technologies and thus first nullify expensive
reduction measures taken in rich countries
and then bring the global trend on a waste
path - a nightmare scenario. Hence, NHDC
probably is even the only eﬀective policy to-
wards curbing radical climate change. And
this insight hopefully will also change the
behavior of realist politicians.
This argument also helps to resolve an open
problem, namely completing NHDC by fix-
ing the upper limit of countries whose GHG
abatement shall be financed by rich coun-
tries. In principle, the initial arguments in
favor of NHDC as against certificate egali-
tarianism (i.e. lower utility loss if rich coun-
tries pay for the reduction than if poor
countries do) lead to taking that mean na-
tional income that is identical to the global
mean (always corrected for purchasing
power) as the upper limit of passive abate-
ment subvention.This is against the spirit of
Intergenerational Justice Review
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rich (OECD and rich OPEC) countries pay
the GHG abatement of poor, developing
(and perhaps poor emerging) countries,
whereas the middle group of countries only
pays their own emission reductions. Accord-
ing to certificate egalitarianism, the emission
certificates for rich countries would be far
below their present emissions; however even
some of the poor countries exceed their
egalitarian emission limits so that these
countries, with certificate egalitarianism,
would have to invest a considerable part of
their development capacities into GHG
abatement; and that, in a certain sense, cons-
titutes a harm to them.The idea of NHDC
is to take these abatement costs of poor
countries by assigning them more than the
egalitarian share of emission certificates and
a lesser share to the rich countries. Shukla
e.g. has defended this principle.22 A model
for implementing this idea technically is
joint implementation in the way that rich
countries provide highly eﬃcient energy
technology to poor partner countries. In
order to get the biggest polluters into the
boat of GHG abating countries now, the de-
finition of ‘poor’ has to be stipulated so that
China (and hence India) counts as poor for
some more time still.
From a welfarist point of view – e.g. for utili-
tarianism, prioritarianism, welfare leximin
or moderate welfare egalitarianism –NHDC
is clearly morally better than certificate egali-
tarianism.Though certificate egalitarianism
benefits the very poor countries, which may
gain from selling certificates not used by
them, countries who are somewhat better oﬀ
have already trespassed the egalitarian limit
or would do so soon under unrestricted con-
ditions. Therefore, they have to renounce
further development or to invest in more
GHG-eﬃcient energy.The idea of NHDC
is to make rich countries pay for this invest-
ment instead of poor countries (as in cer-
tificate egalitarianism), because the resulting
welfare loss in rich countries will be lower.
The first reason for this is the decreasing
marginal utility of income, whereby sub-
tracting one dollar from a poor person's in-
come decreases his utility more than
subtracting one dollar from a richer person's
income. Because of this reason, already
utilitarianism prefers NHDC to an egalita-
rian distribution of emission certificates.
Prioritarianism, moderate welfare egalitaria-
nism and welfare leximin make this prefe-
rence still stronger because they give more
weight to utility changes among people
worse oﬀ than to the same utility change for
the earth), obstacles or may even prevent de-
velopment inThird World countries, and it
is grossly unfair in terms of all major theories
of distributive justice like welfare egalitar-
ianism, prioritarianism, suﬃcientarianism,15
welfare leximin16 or utilitarianism etc.
Distribution according to GDP, which has
been proposed byWirth / Lashoﬀ and Cline
as one component of a more comprehensive
distribution scheme,17 is diﬀerent from
grandfathering because GHG emissions are
not proportional to GDP, so it rewards emis-
sion eﬃciency to a certain extent. Distribu-
tion according to GDP, however, privileges
the rich and thus is again unfair, and
obstacles the development of poor countries.
Some distribution proposals which merit
more discussion are the following:
Certificate egalitarianism, popularized by the
Global Commons Institute under the name
of ‘contraction and convergence’, aims at an
equal distribution of emission certificates to
all persons (convergence) over the medium
term, where the sum of the certificates is de-
fined by a global reduction target (contrac-
tion). Certificate egalitarianism is a specific
precept (dealing only with certificate distri-
bution), which may be justified as an appli-
cation of the (primary) moral principle
‘resource egalitarianism’.Welfare egalitarian-
ism, which is another (primary) moral prin-
ciple, on the other hand, will not lead to
certificate egalitarianism because an equal
number of certificates for diﬀerent people
will often lead to diﬀerent levels of well-
being or welfare. Certificate egalitarianism
has found many supporters among theo-
reticians.18
Historical responsibility is a precept to be ap-
plied in combination with other maxims,
e.g. certificate egalitarianism, and requires
polluters who in the past have exceeded the
justified limit of emissions to pay for the da-
mages generated (historical debts, cf. sect.
3). Usually the respective responsibility is at-
tributed to states, and the historical debt is
calculated on an egalitarian basis, i.e. excess
emissions are equal to actual emissions
minus individual emission budget times po-
pulation size. Historical excess emissions
have been calculated (and their redemptions
proposed), e.g. starting from the year 195019
or even 1800.20 The principle of historical
responsibilities has found supporters in par-
ticular among friends of poor countries.21
No harm for developing countries (NHDC) is
a distribution directive according to which,
on the basis of a tripartition of countries,
beyond their own emission reduction the
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progressive norm welfarism, which inter alia
should resolve the problem of excessive
moral demand. Progressive norm welfarism
blocks this excess by its criterion for imple-
menting new norms, which aims at en-
forcing the morally best norms that are
currently realisable.The combination of op-
timality and realisability leads to the proper
upper limit. The kernel of the initial argu-
ment is that the consumption of one Euro in
relatively poor countries leads to more utility
than the respective consumption in rich
countries. Now this argument would lead to
promoting development aid for the poorest
countries but not to invest the money in im-
proving the welfare in far richer countries
such as China. However, there are two addi-
tional mechanisms that radically change the
utilities. First, many of the impending dama-
ges caused by climate change, unlike the da-
mages resulting from global absolute poverty,
are threshold phenomena (aridization, mel-
ting of icebergs, etc), so that the utility of pre-
venting these thresholds from being exceeded
is extraordinarily high. Second, undertaking
actions that lead to eﬀective climate agree-
ments, which radically and eﬀectively curb
global emissions by including all major emit-
ters, would constitute a leap in utility with res-
pect to the current situation.This leap goes
far beyond the utility gained by shifting con-
sumption from rich countries e.g. to China.
Such a utility leap does not exist in the field
of development aid - unfortunately. Getting
China into the boat of such a climate agree-
ment is crucial here and of strategic impor-
tance, because China is the strongest emitter,
with emissions still rapidly increasing, and be-
cause China is one of the richest countries
contemplable for receiving subventions - in
fact, many westerners think China is far too
rich to be eligible for subventions. However,
the utility leap results only from accompli-
shing the eﬀective agreement; subventions
beyond what is necessary in order to convince
strategically important contract parties lead
only to the initially considered shift in con-
sumption with a utility increase, in the case of
China, lower than the increase achieved by
investing in good development aid for the
poorest countries.The NHDCnorm that can
be proposed on the basis of these reflections is
that, the upper eligibility limit for subven-
tions should be somewhat higher than the
present mean income in China, e.g. equal to
the Chinese mean income expected in ten
years (corrected for purchasing power).
These considerations concerning the moral
value of subsidizing GHG abatement in rela-
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tively poor countries go hand in hand with
considerations concerning the current realis-
ability of NHDC. At present most western-
ers are not particularly magnanimous towards
Chinese people, as they are considered
responsible for the loss of jobs in richer coun-
tries. Though this attitude is neither jus-
tified nor fair, the strategic argument just out-
lined is probably the only one that might con-
vince these westerners to accept the suggested
norm - along with their concrete experiences
(e.g. of hurricanes) that the bad eﬀects of cli-
mate change will also be hitting home.
Would progressive norm welfarism adopt the
principle of historical responsibility andmake
developed countries pay for their ‘historical
debts’? No. According to progressive norma-
tivism, social norms, in particular the norm of
indemnifying damages caused and still more
specifically the polluter-pays principle, have
the instrumental function of motivating
moral behavior. However, this function can
only be fulfilled if in the moment of decision
the agent knows which action is sanctioned
by the respective norm. Until recently (about
1990) no application of the polluter-pays
principle to GHG emissions could satisfy this
condition because the harmful eﬀects of such
emissions were not suﬃciently clear.23 Today,
of course, the polluter-pays principle should
enter the GHG contracts in the form of a
kind of fine for exceeding GHG limits, but
not in the form of recognizing historical
debts.
These constructive justifications of NHDC
without recognition of historical debts shall
now be complemented by some intuitionistic
arguments. Several pragmatic diﬃculties
count against the principle of recognizing his-
torical debts. Past emissions cannot be quan-
tified exactly, political boundaries and, above
all, population sizes have changed consider-
ably. Past GHG emissions were not only use-
ful for the immediate consumer but at least
some part was also useful for the whole of
later mankind insofar as these emissions were
a by-product of technical development that
also benefited people in countries with his-
torically fewer emissions. Where it may be
sensible that together with our wealth we
have inherited also the costs generated by its
creation, it is far less clear why we should also
inherit mere costs of consumption that had
nothing to do with the creation of that
wealth. While people on an individual level
can reject a heritage it is unclear whether and
in what way we can reject a collective her-
itage; and if this is unclear the application of
the heritage idea to the collective level may be
unfair. Finally, historical debts will eventually
have been paid, so that indemnified countries
needing special help will no longer receive
these extra gratuities.
Many arguments against every kind of pri-
mary egalitarianism (in particular resource or
welfare egalitarianism) criticize that the ideal
of equality has never been justified positively;
its defenders take it as natural or evident; its
critics just do not feel this. Egalitarianism is a
comparative ethics. Isn't this kind of always
making comparisons a repugnant character
trait, namely a fruit of envy, which cannot
bear that someone else is better oﬀ - instead of
sharing the other person’s pleasure?The most
radical consequence of this character trait is
levelling down, i.e. preferring that everybody
be equally badly oﬀ to only some people
being well oﬀ. Certificate egalitarianism is a
special kind of resource egalitarianism. How-
ever, the primary objects of a just distribution
should be primary, intrinsic goods and not
mere means like emission certificates because
a special distribution pattern of means may
lead to a completely diﬀerent distribution
pattern of primary goods.24 So an egalitarian
distribution of emission certificates does not
consider the welfare consequences of this dis-
tribution, neither does it consider special
needs in energy consumption, like heating in
highmountain regions or areas near the poles,
nor the economic impact on and economic
power of countries, in particular the curbing
eﬀect on developing countries.
A general problemwith certificate egalitarian-
ism is that it is fixated on one special problem.
Given the economic needs and aspirations of
developing countries, however, it seems to be
sure that a solution to the climate problem
can only be reached by also addressing the
issue of sustainable development.
Certificate egalitarianism is sometimes de-
fended as being favourable to developing
countries, and to a certain degree it does, in
fact, help the poorest countries. Yet, if that
ist considered a moral advantage, a more di-
rect way to express this particular concern
for the poor is prioritarianism; and generos-
ity can be better practiced through the
various forms of welfarism, which along
with progressive normativism have led to the
maxim NHDC. According to progressive
normativism, what is still more important,
however, than these principles and maxims
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is the great-hearted motivation itself to re-
duce one’s own GHG emissions and to
actively install strict reduction norms in
society.
Notes
1. Data from the National Energy Adminis-
tration of China, however, imply that since
2005 China has diminished the carbon in-
tensity of its economy (GCP 2008).
2. Kverndokk 1995, 130-131; 146
3. Lumer 2002.
4. Mabey et al. 1997, 380.
5. Sustainable reduction was morally opti-
mal according to utilitarian and prioritarian
evaluation criteria and morally required by a
sustainability criterion, Kantianism and the
no-harm criterion (Lumer 2002, 75, 78-80).
6. GCP 2008, Appendix.
7. There may be few winners of global
warming, e.g. farmers in the northern USA,
southern Canada or some parts of Russia.
Of course, these people do not have any ra-
tional interest in stopping global warming.
However, these small fractions never sum up
to a nation's majority.
8. In 2000 the mean GHG emissions of
only about 25 of the poorest, mostly Afri-
can, countries were equal or below the sus-
tainable level of then about 1.5 t CO2
equivalent/capita (cf. WRI 2009).
9. Lumer 2002, 104.
10. A norm is vague if its content is not
completely clear; it is weak if it does not re-
quire costly actions.
11. However, on the basis of this weak norm
and for reasons of fairness as well as to en-
courage earlier eﬀorts, it may be right to re-
quire from those countries which did not
follow this norm that, in a global climate
agreement, they be obliged to make good for
this omission by stronger eﬀorts or by
receiving lower emission permits.
12. Mackie 1977, ch. 1.
13. In a more detailed and precise discus-
sion, it would be necessary to specify the
underlying welfare function. In such cases,
I endorse a special kind of prioritarianism
(Lumer 2006; 2000, ch. 7).
14.The name ‘progressive norm welfarism’
has been coined in analogy to names like
‘ideal rule utilitarianism’, where the ‘ism’ de-
notes the moral value function (welfarism),
the other noun denotes the kind of objects
that are central to the theory and that are
primarily valued (socially valid norms), and
the adjective gives some further specification
(here: progressiveness, i.e. that the morally
justified socially valid norms shall be his-
torically more and more ambitious).
15. Suﬃcientarianism is the principle that
everybody should dispose of the necessary
resources at least at the suﬃciency level.
16. Leximin is a social preference order that
prefers the one of two states where the re-
spectively worst oﬀ is better oﬀ; if the worst
oﬀ persons in both states are equally bad oﬀ,
leximin prefers the state where the second
worst oﬀ is better oﬀ; etc.
17. Wirth/Lashoﬀ 1990 and Cline 1992.
18. E.g. Athanasiou/Baer 2002, 47 ﬀ.;
Ghosh 1993; Grübler/Fujii 1991; Meyer
2001, 56 ﬀ; Ott 2003, 196-197.; Page 2006,
177-179; Paterson 1996; Shue 1993;
Welsch 1993.
19. Smith 1993, 37-41.
20. den Elzen et al. 1993; Grübler/Fujii
1991; Grübler/Nakicenovic 1991.
21. Hyder 1992; Smith et al. 1993
22. Shukla 1990.
23.This justification for excluding liability
does not hold for subjectively risky behavior,
such as pharmaceutical research, because
subjective risk can already establish liability.
CO2-emissions, however, were not even sub-
jectively risky before that date. And, of
course, that justification does not exclude
historical debts generally but historical debts
from, according to the present scientific
knowledge, allegedly harmless actions.
24.This does not exclude that, for reasons
of practicability, theories of justice deter-
mine also diﬀerent secondary distribution
patterns for certain means, which are
expected to lead to the desired distribution
of primary goods. However, even welfare
egalitarianism, which determines just distri-
butions in terms of the primary object of
welfare, does not imply certificate egalitarian-
ism; only resource egalitarianism does,
which again speaks of secondary goods.
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Epistemic Uncertainties in Climate Predictions.
A Challenge for Practical Decision Making
by Prof. Dr. Dr. Rafaela Hillerbrand1
bstract: Most scientists agree that, at
least for the time being, unquanti-
fied uncertainties are inevitably con-
nected to predictions of climate models.
Uncertainties, however, do not justify political
inaction. This paper addresses the question of
how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for
practical decision making. It is shown how
common decision approaches based on the pre-
cautionary principle fail to adequately deal
with uncertainties as they arise in climate mod-
eling. I argue that with regards to climate
change, unquantified uncertainties can neither
be ignored in decision making nor be reduced
to quantified ones by assigning subjective prob-
abilities.This distinguishes the ethical problems
associated with climate change from other prob-
lems regarding energy supply and demand like,
for example, those associated with nuclear
power.
Introduction
The uncertainty of climate predictions is dis-
cussed intensively within the scientific com-
munity – not only among climate sceptics.
However, uncertainties are often kept under
wraps when scientific findings are commu-
nicated to the public.2 It is not the scientists
who are to blame here. Rather the practical
debate seems incapable of adequately reflect-
ing uncertainties in modeling predictions. If
these uncertainties were communicated,
sound scientific research runs the risk of
being discredited as unscientific; the public
seems to prefer black and white instead of
the scientists' shades of grey. Often predic-
tions are taken either as correct and unques-
tionably reliable or simply as wrong.
However, most scientific models are neither
true, in the sense that they exactly predict
future events, nor simply wrong and use-
less.3 It is argued in this paper that in order
to incorporate aspects of inter- and intragen-
erational justice, practical decision making
has to carefully consider the shades of grey
A
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